China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increasingly demonstrated its ability to project joint combat power across the Indo-Pacific and Africa without relying on a formal network of overseas military bases. Central to this evolution is the integration of the PLA Army (PLAA) with the PLA Navy (PLAN) to conduct complex expeditionary logistics and amphibious operations. A recent China Maritime Report from the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights how Beijing is transforming routine overseas engagements into laboratories for expeditionary warfare, validating a new model of “access without basing” (Arostegui, 2026).
Maturation of Expeditionary Capabilities
Since 2023, the PLA has established an annualized rhythm of loading PLAA combat, engineering, and support units onto PLAN amphibious ships for international exercises (Arostegui, 2026). This integration represents a significant maturation in Chinese expeditionary logistics, providing Beijing with a proven framework to project sustained, multi-domain combat mass well beyond the First Island Chain. While the PLAN Marine Corps remains a relatively light force, the PLAA possesses the heavy armor, indirect fires, and logistical trains required for sustained expeditionary power (Arostegui, 2026). By successfully deploying heavy assets such as ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicles and PCL-171 howitzers via PLAN lift, China demonstrates that its overseas power projection ceiling is not constrained by its marine corps (Arostegui, 2026).
The Role of the Type 071 Amphibious Transport Dock
At the center of this effort is the Type 071 (Yuzhao-class) amphibious transport dock, which has evolved into a critical test platform for loading heavy ground forces, refining joint logistics, and validating the command relationships necessary for such operations (Arostegui, 2026). The Type 071 features a vehicle deck, well-deck, landing deck, and hangar, capable of carrying a combination of marines, vehicles, landing craft, and helicopters (Wikipedia, n.d.). It can transport up to 800 troops and approximately 60 armored fighting vehicles, making it a formidable asset for amphibious assaults and expeditionary missions (Wikipedia, n.d.). The PLAN currently operates eight Type 071 vessels, with an additional unit exported to the Royal Thai Navy (Wikipedia, n.d.).
Validation Through Overseas Exercises
Overseas military exercises serve as vital proving grounds for the PLA to stress-test complex port embarkation, loading, and well-deck management. Two exercises conducted between 2023 and 2025 illustrate the scope of this effort.
Cambodia — Golden Dragon 2025: The seventh iteration of the Golden Dragon joint exercises involved Chinese military personnel assembling on the flight deck of the Changbaishan, a Type 071 amphibious landing ship, prior to deployment to Cambodia (Strangio, 2025). The vessel subsequently docked at the new Ream Naval Base in southern Cambodia, highlighting the strategic utility of Chinese-funded overseas facilities (Strangio, 2025). The exercises focused on joint counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance operations, incorporating land, air, and maritime components (Strangio, 2025).
Tanzania — Peace Unity-2024: In July and August 2024, the Sino-Tanzanian training exercise Peace Unity-2024 provided the PLA an opportunity to apply its growing joint expeditionary capability (Vartanian, 2024). The exercise involved PLAA, PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, and PLA Information Support Force elements deployed to Africa using multiple methods of transportation, including Y-20 strategic transport aircraft and Type 071 amphibious landing dock vessels (Vartanian, 2024). The exercise represented the largest ever PLA deployment in Africa, featuring both land operations in Tanzania and naval operations in Mozambican waters (Nantulya, 2026).
Strategic Context: “Access Without Basing”
These developments are rooted in the 2015 China’s Military Strategy white paper directive that the PLAA expand beyond its traditional role as a force focused on China’s borders and prepare to protect the PRC’s overseas strategic interests (State Council Information Office, 2015). Delivering heavy ground packages enables the PLA to validate its “access without basing” logistics model, which relies on using civilian port infrastructure and local stevedore services across the Indo-Pacific and Africa to support deployments (Arostegui, 2026). Transporting ground forces overseas also allows the PLA to engage in critical army-to-army diplomacy with partner nations that possess dominant ground forces but lack substantial naval capabilities, helping secure theater access and build geopolitical influence (Arostegui, 2026).
The successful deployment of PLAA ground forces via PLAN lift proves that the multi-branch coordination mechanisms intended by the 2016 military reforms are actively functioning (Arostegui, 2026). The PLAN’s growing role in transporting and enabling army forces indicates that PLA joint expeditionary capabilities beyond the First Island Chain are no longer a future aspiration—they are an emerging operational reality.
References
Arostegui, J. (2026). China Maritime Report #55: Loading the Well Deck: The PLA Navy’s Maturing Role in Projecting Joint Ground Forces. CMSI China Maritime Reports, 55. China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College.
Nantulya, P. (2026, January 30). China’s Military Footprint in Africa Deepens with PLA-led BRICS Naval Drills. Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2015, May). China’s Military Strategy. Xinhua.
Strangio, S. (2025, May 12). Cambodia, China Prepare to Launch ‘Golden Dragon’ Military Exercises. The Diplomat.
Vartanian, J. (2024, October 9). Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania. SSI Media, U.S. Army War College.
Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Type 071 amphibious transport dock. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
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